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Abstract 
Using bank balance sheet data, we find evidence that leverage and asset risk of European multinational 
banks in the crisis and post-crisis period is affected by corporate taxes in their host country as well as 
by the tax rates in all the jurisdictions where the banking group operates. Then, we evaluate the effects 
that establishing tax neutrality between debt and equity finance has on systemic risk. We show that the 
degree of coordination in implementing the hypothetical tax reform matters. In particular, a coordinated 
elimination of the tax advantage of debt would significantly reduce systemic losses in the event of a 
severe banking crisis. By contrast, uncoordinated tax reforms are not equally beneficial. This is because 
national tax policies generate spillovers through cross-border bank activities and tax-driven strategic 
allocation of debt and asset risk across group affiliates. 
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1. Introduction  
Taxes are a first-order determinant of firms’ capital structure choices (Titman and Wessels, 
1988; MacKie-Mason, 1990; Desai et al., 2004). In particular, by making interest payments 
deductible from the taxable base, standard corporate income tax systems confer an advantage 
to debt over equity. The tax benefit of debt encourages excessive corporate indebtedness, and 
thus represents an important source of risk, particularly for the highly leveraged financial sector 
(De Mooij, 2014). In fact, it is widely held that banks’ high debt levels have increased 
vulnerability of the financial sector to shocks and amplified the negative impacts of the recent 
global financial crisis. Therefore, in the aftermath of the crisis, amidst the concerted regulatory 
initiatives to reduce leverage in the financial sector, the perverse incentives of corporate taxes 
on banks’ debt policies have attracted renewed academic and policy interest. Strikingly, by 
indirectly penalising equity, standard tax rules undermine the bank solvency and capital 
adequacy efforts that have been central to the post-crisis reform agenda. Thus, by distorting 
incentives at the microeconomic level, tax policy ultimately affects systemic risk (Roe and 
Tröge, 2017). This is the focus of our analysis.  
Two issues arise when considering how interest deductibility – not accompanied by an equal 
relief for equity finance – artificially inflates banks’ demand for debt. First, since the value of 
the tax deduction increases with the corporate income tax rate, the distortion will be particularly 
marked in high-tax jurisdictions, all else equal. Second, the rise of international banks has 
highlighted a distinctive feature of multinational groups, that is the potential to take advantage 
of international tax differences to minimize their tax bill by concentrating debt where the 
generosity of the tax relief is higher. In particular, in a high-tax location, all else equal, debt 
finance is attractive because the interest costs can be deducted from taxable income at a high 
rate. By contrast, in a low-tax jurisdiction, all else equal, equity finance is more attractive since 
the returns will be taxed at a lower rate with the repatriated dividends usually tax exempt for 
the parent. All in all, taxation can affect financial structure choices of international banks via 
two channels. First, there is the standard debt bias effect, which encourages the use of debt 
because of the level of local taxation. Second, there is a debt shifting effect, which allows 
multinational groups to minimize the cost of debt by taking advantage of international tax 
differences.  
At the same time, however, banks are subject to regulatory requirements that may, to a large 
extent, affect not only their financing decisions, but also the composition of their asset portfolio. 
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Bank regulation on minimum capital requirements as in the Basel framework creates 
dependency between bank indebtedness and asset risk. In particular, leverage risk and portfolio 
risk become substitutes if banks balance bankruptcy cost with other benefits of debt financing, 
such as the tax shield (Orgler and Taggart, 1983). In other words, when funding risk is limited 
by regulation, risk-averse banks at least partly undo the effect on their total risk by taking on 
more portfolio risk (Devereux et al., 2017; Horvath, 2013). This behaviour is fully consistent 
with theoretical models where banks behave like competitive portfolio managers, in the sense 
that they structure their balance sheet, taking prices and yields as given, so as to maximise the 
expected utility of their financial net worth (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 
1988).  
In this paper, we investigate the impact of corporate taxation on capital structure choices and 
asset risk of banking groups in Europe, and evaluate the financial stability implications of 
eliminating the favourable tax treatment of debt finance. First, we examine how corporate taxes 
affect two indicators of balance sheet risk, namely debt and risk-weighted assets (RWA), 
respectively, both normalised with respect to the level of total assets. Specifically, we run panel 
non-linear regressions using bank balance sheet data for the years 2008-2014. Equipped with 
the predicted changes to our outcome variables obtained from the econometric estimates, we 
then quantify the effects of eliminating the favourable treatment of debt on systemic risk. We 
take the amount of systemic losses originating in the banking sector in the event of a severe 
crisis as our metric to proxy for financial stability outcomes. In particular, we consider excess 
losses, i.e. those losses that are not absorbed by ad hoc instruments set up by the banks, notably 
provisions, regulatory capital and equity cushions (including potential recapitalization). We 
obtain such losses using a micro-simulation bank portfolio model that fits in the Basel 
framework for minimum capital requirements. In the model setup, risk on both sides of banks’ 
balance sheets is indeed pivotal in determining the simulated outcomes. When it comes to the 
policy changes that set a level playing field between debt and equity, we distinguish different 
reform scenarios, depending on the degree of coordination among reforming countries. A 
concerted approach to tax reforms matters since the impacts of national policies spill over across 
countries. This is due to the fact that multinational banks, faced with a trade-off in the standard 
portfolio selection context, allocate group debt and asset risk internationally among the group 
affiliates.  
Our work contributes to different strands of the literature. First, there is a burgeoning empirical 
literature on debt bias in the banking sector that builds on the well-established research on non-
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financial companies (Feld et al., 2013, and Huizinga et al., 2008). Keen and de Mooij (2016), 
Hemmelgarn and Teichmann (2015), and Heckemeyer and de Mooij (2016) show that the 
capital structure of international banks is sensitive to corporate taxes. Similar conclusions are 
reached by Schepens (2016) and Celerier et al. (2017), who focus on the tax shield to the return 
to equity created by the Belgian allowance for corporate equity (ACE). To the best of our 
knowledge, the first – and, so far, only – evidence on debt shifting by multinational banks in a 
cross-country setting has been provided by Gu et al. (2015). Reiter (2017) investigates whether 
the allocation of internal debt within German banks is driven by taxation. Strategic use of debt 
to shift income to lower taxed group affiliates is particularly relevant for banks, since provisions 
to curb profit shifting, such as controlled-foreign-corporation and thin capitalisation rules, often 
do not apply to financial institutions (de Mooij and Hebous, 2018). His focus is indeed on how 
the internal capital market can be exploited to reduce the total tax burden on multinational 
banks, while the implications for financial stability are not considered. When it comes to the 
microsimulation exercise, our work follows Langedijk et al. (2015), who investigate the public 
finance impacts of eliminating the debt bias, and provide a rich set of sensitivity results based 
on different behavioural parameters for the reaction of bank capital structure to taxation. Like 
theirs, our contribution adds to the recent literature that emphasizes how tax policy creates 
distortions in terms of increased systemic risk (de Mooij et al., 2014). However, importantly, 
they neglect the debt shifting channel. This implies that the public finance savings stemming 
from the elimination of debt bias that they obtain might be overestimated. Moreover, naturally, 
their framework cannot capture the cross-country spillovers generated by debt shifting, which 
is instead pivotal to our analysis.  
Indeed, we find that, although it creates room for banks to increase the riskiness of their asset 
portfolio, a level playing field between debt and equity finance improves financial stability, in 
that it reduces the cost of banking crises. The extent to which any increase in capital is matched 
by an increase in the risk weight of assets depends on whether banks target an internal bank-
specific risk-weighted capital ratio (or a target buffer to the minimum capital requirement). 
When the international channel of adjustment is factored in, we find that eliminating the tax 
bias towards debt would result in a significant reduction of the losses generated in the event of 
a severe bank crisis. Moreover, the degree of coordination in implementing the tax reform 
matters in terms of financial stability implications, both at the national and at the aggregate 
level. Unilateral tax reforms, while beneficial for the reforming country, create negative 
spillovers for the countries where the favourable treatment of debt is still in place. In this 
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respect, our results concur with the conclusions by Hebous and Ruf (2017), who find that the 
Belgian allowance for corporate equity (ACE), by increasing intra-group lending and other 
types of passive investments, opened up tax planning opportunities for German multinationals. 
We show that the lack of coordination entails a similar risk also from a financial stability 
standpoint.  
From a policy perspective, our analysis is both relevant and timely. Major corporate tax reforms 
on both sides of the Atlantic provide for substantial limitations to the tax advantage of debt over 
equity. In particular, the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal in 
Europe introduces an allowance that makes increases in equity deductible from the taxable base. 
Although our microsimulation setup is admittedly very stylised, our findings suggest that, when 
applied to banks, this type of allowance has the potential to improve financial stability by 
reducing systemic losses in the event of a severe crisis. Moreover, if introduced in a coordinated 
fashion, such reform would eliminate the incentives for banks to shift risk across national 
borders following existing corporate tax differential in Europe. In this respect, our results 
highlight important benefits of tax coordination, which have not been contemplated by the 
traditional public finance literature (Bovenberg et al., 2003). They also show that different 
policies affecting the banking sector are interrelated, and suggests that their interaction can be 
exploited for macro-prudential purposes. Indeed, tax reforms might be used as a tool that is 
complementary to capital requirements and other quantity-based regulatory provisions aimed 
to enhance the stability and resilience of the banking system. However, the tax-induced cross-
border allocation of debt and risk of multinational banks distorts the incentives for national 
policy makers, thus creating issues that echo those highlighted by Beck et al. (2013) with 
respect to banking supervision. In our setting, coordination is particularly beneficial as it 
resolves the misalignment between banks’ geographic boundaries and national tax policies 
affecting their indebtedness and riskiness. Thus, in a broader perspective, our analysis and 
results are suggestive of other elements, namely tax policy, further complicating the trilemma 
of financial integration illustrated by Schoenmaker (2010), which states that financial 
integration, financial stability and national sovereignty in bank regulation cannot be achieved 
simultaneously.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical analysis, 
including the econometric model and the data. Section 3 illustrates the results. The setup of the 
microsimulation exercise is introduced in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the simulation 
results. Section 6 offers a critical discussion. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Empirical analysis 
2.1 Model specification  
To assess the impacts of corporate taxes on banks’ financing choices and asset risk we specify 
an estimating equation in the spirit of Huizinga et al. (2008). In their setup, as adapted by Gu 
et al. (2015), the capital structure of a bank in a multinational group depends on the tax rates of 
all the countries where the group has affiliates, not only on the domestic tax rate. Specifically, 
the outcome variable of interest at time t of bank 𝑖 belonging to group g can be expressed as:  
𝜆𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑿𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 + 𝜙𝑔 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑔,𝑡. (1) 
In our main specification, the dependent variable, 𝜆𝑖,𝑔,𝑡, is defined as the ratio between total 
liabilities (𝐷𝑖,𝑔,𝑡) and total assets (𝐴𝑖,𝑔,𝑡) of bank 𝑖 at year 𝑡. As discussed in the Introduction, 
to fully appreciate the effects of taxes on banks’ behaviour, one has to consider that founding 
risk can be shifted to the asset side of the balance sheet. Accordingly, we use risk-weighted 
asset density, i.e. the ratio between risk-weighted assets and total assets, as our alternative 
dependent variable. The two tax terms are the main explanatory variables of interest. First, the 
variable 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 is the statutory corporate income tax rate in the host country. This tax rate 
captures the incentives for a purely domestic bank. Since the tax savings due to interest 
deduction are proportional to the tax rate, we expect  𝛽1 > 0 for our leverage equation. By 
contrast, we anticipate a reversed sign for the same coefficient in the asset risk equation. This 
is because in the Basel regulatory framework higher debt reduces the scope for taking up risk 
on the asset side of the balance sheet. The second tax term is the average corporate tax rate of 
the banking group in all locales where it operates other than the country of affiliate 𝑖, indicated 
with 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑔,𝑡. The composite tax term weighs the statutory tax rates in alternative 
locations by the shares of assets that each affiliate to group g holds in the respective locale:  
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑗,𝑔,𝑡𝑤𝑗,𝑔,𝑡
𝑗≠𝑖;𝑖,𝑗∈𝑔
, 
where 𝑤𝑗,𝑔,𝑡 ≡ 𝐴𝑗,𝑔,𝑡/Σ𝑗∈𝑔𝐴𝑗,𝑔,𝑡1. The rationale for this weighting scheme is straightfoward. The 
incentives of a bank to take up debt or risky assets depend on its size. Specifically, large 
subsidiaries have more room for increasing their (absolute) debt level in response to a tax 
increase without affecting significantly their debt ratio. By contrast, small affiliates have 
                                           
1 In a robustness check, we use weights based on employment instead of assets. The results are not affected.  
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relatively low capacity to absorb debt compared to the large group affiliates. The same holds 
true for asset risk. The average tax term captures the incentives to shift debt or risk within the 
multinational group by exploiting international tax differences. Naturally, we expect 𝛽2 < 0 for 
the leverage equation. As before, we expect a reversed sign in the asset risk equation2.  
The vector X in equation (1) includes a number of bank-level and country-level control 
variables. First, we use a dummy that takes on the value one if the affiliate is the parent bank in 
the group considered, and zero if it is a subsidiary. In contrast to Gu et al. (2015), we do not 
limit our analysis to bank subsidiaries. Instead, we estimate the debt ratio equation for all group 
affiliates, i.e. parent and subsidiaries. In this setup, we can check whether parent banks behave 
differently from their subsidiaries in terms of debt ratios and asset risk, controlling for relevant 
determinants of the two variables. For instance, Dischinger et al. (2014) find a systematic and 
significant difference in profitability in multinational groups between parents and their 
subsidiaries, which they attribute to the home market advantage. When it comes to financing 
choices, the theoretical literature emphasizes the role of debt finance in mitigating managerial 
incentive problems (Aghion and Bolton, 1989). In that case, we would expect a more substantial 
use of debt in the subsidiaries than in parent banks, as asymmetric information is a bigger 
concern for the former.  
For the bank-specific controls we rely on the variables usually employed in the literature on 
banks’ capital structure (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2004; Gropp and Heider, 
2009), which we discuss next. The same controls are then used in the risk-weighted assets 
equation. First of all, we allow for size effects by including the book value of the bank’s fixed 
assets (in logs). Arguably, a positive relationship between size and leverage can be expected 
due to easier access to credit, also thanks to better diversification opportunities. Similarly, large 
intermediaries may benefit from a too-big-to-fail guarantee that incentivises taking up debt. 
Profitability is also expected to affect leverage, albeit in an ambiguous way. On one hand, very 
profitable institutions might gain easier access to external finance because they are perceived 
as safer than their less profitable peers. On the other hand, if profits are retained within the firm, 
the need for external finance would decline with the level of profitability, ceteris paribus. We 
include the return on assets (ROA) as a measure of profitability. Furthermore, to account for 
the fact that growing banks invest more, and thus could have incentives to accumulate more 
debt, all other factors being equal, we include also the growth rate of total assets. Collateral is 
                                           
2 Both Huizinga et al. (2008) and Gu et al. (2015) constrain the impacts of domestic and foreign taxes to be the same. By using 
separately the two tax terms, instead of their difference, we allow for a differential effect of domestic and foreign taxation.    
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also linked to capital structure choices, although the direction of the impact is again ambiguous. 
Collateralised assets might ultimately disincentivise firm reliance on retained earnings by 
facilitating external borrowing and reducing the cost of issuing debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
In this case, we would expect a positive relationship between collateral and leverage, as in 
Gropp and Heider (2009). At the same time, tangible, depreciable assets may create non-debt 
tax shields. These might make debt and tangible assets act as substitutes, as an instrument for 
reducing the tax liability (De Angelo and Masulis, 1980). Following Gropp and Heider (2009), 
we proxy collateral with the proportion of security assets and non-earnings assets over the book 
value of total assets. This definition includes liquid securities that can be used as collateral when 
borrowing from central banks3. To avoid simultaneity between the dependent and the 
explanatory variables, we use lagged values of the bank-specific controls throughout.  
We include a set of additional explanatory variables that vary at the country-year level. 
Specifically, we control for GDP growth and inflation using the annual variation of the 
consumer price index. Moreover, we account for government intervention in the banking 
systems in the wake of the crisis using two additional variables4. First, we include in the 
regression the cumulated government spending on bank recapitalization, and government 
guarantees to bank borrowing, for impaired assets, as well as liquidity and other assistance 
measures, as a fraction of total assets in the national banking sectors. Arguably, public support 
to ailing institutions might affect capital structure choices also of healthy intermediaries, not 
least by acting as an explicit guarantee. Second, we account for the staggered introduction of 
bank levies in several European countries after the crisis using a dummy that takes the value 
one for the countries-years where any such taxes are in place. Devereux et al. (2017) provide 
evidence that levies, mostly designed as taxes on the book value of risky liabilities, have 
prompted banks’ reaction along several adjustment channels, including equity ratios. Finally, 
our main empirical specification includes a full set of time (𝜌𝑡) and group fixed effects (𝜙𝑔). 
Year dummies allow us to control for aggregate shocks displaying a common trend across 
countries and banks. Group fixed effects control for non-observable, group-specific 
                                           
3 To account for the possibility that alternative tax provisions, such as amortization of financial assets, may dampen the impact 
of interest deductibility we have alternatively used an additional control for non-debt tax shields. This is calculated as the ratio 
of total non-interest expenses over total assets, as in Gu et al. (2015). However, the variable was never significant in our 
specifications. This might stem from the fact that presumably it captures only imperfectly tax shields other than debt.  
4 We do not include the regulatory variables usually employed in cross-country studies because of their lack of variation in our 
sample. Since regulation of the financial sector is harmonized in Europe, we do not control for regulatory variables, such as the 
presence of a deposit insurance scheme, or the minimum capital requirements. Indeed, all European country have a deposit 
guarantee schemes from 1994 (see the Directive 94/19/EC and the following amendments). Moreover, the minimum capital 
ratio requirement is fixed to 8% for our sample, since the introduction of directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC in the 
European countries. 
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characteristics which might determine the debt choices of all affiliates in the banking group. 
For instance, group-specific risk would affect the lending rate and the cost of borrowing (Desai, 
Foley, and Hines, 2004). Conditioning on group-specific fixed effects also allows us to account 
for the structure of each group. If the location pattern of the group is constant over time, group 
dummies are enough to control for selection effects. This is also true if the location pattern 
changes for reasons entirely unrelated to changes in tax policy.  
In a robustness check, we also include country fixed effects to control for time-invariant 
unobserved costs and benefits, potentially heterogeneous across national banking systems, 
which might drive the optimal level of debt for affiliates in different countries. Given our 
sample period, these fixed effects likely capture adjustments in debt ratios and asset risk in the 
wake of the financial crisis. However, they may also per se capture building up and shifting of 
debt or risk (for example because most banks in high-tax countries would be linked to lower-
tax countries), which would result in over-estimating the shifting effect (Buettner and Wamser, 
2013)5.  
2.2 Estimation  
The debt-to-asset ratio can be considered as the fraction of assets that is financed by debt. 
Likewise, the risk-weighted asset density is the fraction of assets at risk. Given the balance 
sheet identity and the regulatory weight structure, the measures are usually bounded between 
zero and one for viable banks. Linear methods, such as OLS, are inappropriate in this case, 
since the estimated expected value of the dependent variable will not necessarily be confined 
into the unit interval. Moreover, OLS estimates a single coefficient capturing the average 
impact of the explanatory variable on the outcome variable. The fact that the impact is constant 
over the whole range of values of the variable is difficult to reconcile with the boundedness of 
the dependent variable, particularly when a significant number of observations is concentrated 
around the corners. In our case, the distribution of the debt ratio in our sample is clearly skewed 
to the left (see next section), while that of the risk-weighted asset density is more symmetric. 
Following Egger et al. (2014), we adopt a nonlinear specification. Specifically, we estimate a 
panel-data fractional response model based on Papke and Wooldridge (2008). In particular, in 
the baseline formulation, we assume that the conditional expectation of the debt ratio, 𝜆𝑖𝑡, with 
𝜆𝑖𝑡 ∈ [0,1], is:  
                                           
5 The inclusion of country fixed effects implies also that the identification of the host tax term, which does not vary within 
countries, is due only to time variation.  
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𝐸[𝜆𝑖𝑡|𝐱𝑖𝑐𝑡] = Φ(𝐱′𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛃), (2) 
where Φ(. ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf), 𝐱𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a column 
vector of explanatory variables, and 𝜷 is the corresponding column vector of parameters6. The 
vector 𝐱𝑖𝑐𝑡includes the tax variables introduced in equation (1), as well as the other controls 
discussed above. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose a Bernoulli quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimation method (QMLE) to estimate equations like the one in (2). The log-likelihood 
function is:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛽 ∑{(1 − 𝜆𝑖𝑐)log [1 − Φ(𝐱
′
𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛃)] + 𝜆𝑖𝑐log [Φ(𝐱
′
𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛃)]}
𝑁
𝑖=1
. 
In this framework, the estimated coefficients 𝜷 are not readily interpretable. By contrast, the 
marginal effects, which measure the impact of the explanatory variables on the outcome 
variable, are7. The marginal effects for a continuous variable 𝑥𝑗𝑡are obtained by differentiating 
equation (2) with respect to the variable of interest, is:  
𝜕𝐸[𝜆𝑖𝑡|𝐱𝑖𝑐𝑡]
𝜕𝑥𝑗𝑡
= β𝑗𝜙(𝐱′𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛃), 
(3) 
Equation (3) shows that the marginal effects depend on the level of the covariates. Hence, the 
impact of each covariate varies with the values of all the other explanatory variables. As a 
synthetic measure of the estimated impacts, we report the average marginal effects, calculated 
as the marginal effects averaged over the population distribution of the variables. The 
asymptotic standard errors of the average marginal effects are obtained with the delta method, 
so as to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The standard errors in the 
regressions are clustered at the bank level, to capture the lack of independence among the 
residuals for a given bank across years (Cameron and Miller, 2015; Petersen, 2009).  
2.3 Data  
We focus on banks based in the European Union (EU). Our sample period covers the years 
from 2008 to 2014. Data from banks’ balance sheets are extracted from the Bankscope database 
compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Since we are interested in the variation of the indebtedness at the 
                                           
6 The use of cumulative distribution function simplifies things. A more general formulation of the type G(𝐱′𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛃) can be used, 
where G(z) is a known function satisfying 0≤G(z)≤1 for all 𝑧 ∈ ℝ.  
7 In fact, since Φ(.) is strictly monotonic, the elements of β only give the directions of the partial effects. 
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level of the individual bank within a banking group, we use unconsolidated statements. Thus, 
we drop entities that report only consolidated accounts. Likewise, we exclude from the analysis 
stand-alone intermediaries.  
A banking group comprises a parent bank and at least one subsidiary bank. Exploiting the 
information on the ownership structure provided in Bankscope, we can match banks with their 
subsidiaries, located in the same country or in other EU countries8. In particular, we define a 
bank as a subsidiary if at least 50% of its shares are owned by another bank. Affiliates owned 
by another subsidiary are all treated as subsidiaries of the parent bank. Naturally, the latter is 
identified as the ultimate owner9. In the econometric analysis we focus on commercial, 
cooperative and savings bank affiliates. Therefore, we keep only groups with at least one 
subsidiary classified as having any of these specialisation types. After this first round of 
cleaning, our initial dataset comprises (at most) 106 banking groups, with 538 affiliates per 
year10.  
Table 1 reports the distribution of banking groups by ownership status and host country. 
Specifically, we distinguish between parent and subsidiaries, and, among the latter, we further 
parse foreign subsidiaries – i.e. banks with a foreign owner –, and national subsidiaries – i.e. 
subsidiaries located in the same country as their parent. Parent banks account for 17% of entities 
in our dataset. Around 40% of the subsidiaries are established in a country other than the one 
where the parent bank is located. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and 
Austria are the countries with the largest number of parent banks. Indeed, roughly 69% of all 
the parent banks in the dataset are located in these countries. Expectedly, the largest markets 
also host most of the national subsidiaries. Foreign subsidiaries (listed by host country) are 
located predominantly in Germany (12%), Luxemburg (17%) and Poland (10%). Table 2 
reports also the distribution of foreign subsidiaries by the country where the parent is located 
(i.e., by home country). According to the table, France, Germany, Italy and Austria are home 
countries to relatively many subsidiaries established outside the national borders.  
[Table 1 here] 
                                           
8 We do not consider branches due to lack of data. Cerutti et al. (2007) stress that, unlike non-financial firms, multinational 
banks often operate through branches instead of subsidiaries. Moreover, they show that local corporate taxes affect the mode 
of bank entry. In particular, entry through branches would be particularly attractive in countries that have higher tax rates.  
9 Bankscope does not record changes to the ownership structure. In practice, the data report the ownership structure observed 
in the last year, which is then superimposed on the data in the previous years. Thus, the composition of the banking groups in 
our sample does not change over time.  
10 Among these, 58 have a specialization that is different from commercial, savings or cooperative. Therefore, they will not be 
considered in the econometric and simulation analyses. Moreover, in the econometric analysis we lose additional observations 
will due to missing values for the variables of interest in the econometric model. 
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In addition to the information on the ownership structure, we draw data on total assets, debt, 
profitability and other relevant balance sheet items from the Bankscope database. Corporate 
income tax (CIT) rates are obtained from ZEW (2017). Importantly, the data allows us to take 
account of the specificities in the rules for the deductibility of interest, notably limitations in 
terms of deductible amount11. Thus, we can measure incentives to debt financing more precisely 
than simply resorting to the headline statutory tax rate on corporate income. Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics of the main variables employed in the regression.  
[Table 2 here] 
3. Econometric results 
In this section we present the results from regressing bank debt ratios and risk-weighted asset 
densities on the tax variables, alongside bank-specific and country-specific controls. We 
estimate variants of the panel fractional probit model in equation (1) using a pooled quasi-
maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) procedure. In all cases, we report the average 
marginal effects obtained from the coefficients in the fractional regressions, which can be 
directly compared to the coefficient estimates from a linear model. 
3.1 Debt- to-asset ratios 
Table 3 shows our baseline results for the debt-to-asset ratios. In the specification in column 
(1) the fiscal incentives towards debt are captured only by the local corporate tax rate. This 
replicates the standard specification used in the literature on the corporate debt bias. The 
coefficient on the local tax rate is positive, confirming the positive host-country tax effect found 
in previous studies. In line with expectations, a higher corporate tax rate is associated with 
higher debt ratios. The average partial effect of 0.3 implies that an increase of 10 percentage 
points in the corporate tax rate increase the debt ratio of a subsidiary on average by 3 percentage 
points. The magnitude of the impact is in the same ballpark as in the existing literature (Desai 
et al., 2004; Huizinga et al., 2008; Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015), including the recent 
contributions on the banking sector. In particular, Heckemeyer and de Mooij, (2017) find an 
average effect of corporate taxes on leverage of 0.23 for international banks. Keen and de Mooij 
(2014) report a long-run coefficient of 0.24 in a sub-sample that excludes the pre-crisis years.  
                                           
11 Limits to deductibility are factored in by applying a correction factor (<1) to the general rate of deduction, normally the 
statutory tax rate.  
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Further, our findings suggest that parent banks are better capitalised than subsidiaries, although 
the effect is not estimated with precision in this specification. When it comes to other 
determinants of the debt ratio, we find that size exerts a positive impact, as expected. Indeed, 
big banks tend to be more leveraged than small intermediaries. Moreover, banks growing faster 
in our sample tend to accumulate more debt. Also, profitability is negatively related to leverage, 
although the effect is not estimated with precision. We also find that the debt ratio depends 
positively on collateral, presumably because it facilitates external borrowing and reduces the 
cost of issuing debt. Among the country-specific controls, GDP growth enters the equation with 
a positive sign, albeit in a non-significant way. By contrast, the coefficient for inflation is 
negative and statistically significant. The cumulated public aid to the banking sector exerts a 
positive impact on leverage, in a marginally significant way. We interpret this as a possible 
moral hazard effect induced by the explicit provision of government guarantees. Finally, we do 
not find evidence that the introduction of the bank levies has affected the capital structure 
choices of the banks in our sample. Arguably, this might be due to the fact that we use somewhat 
a coarse measure for levy exposure – an indicator for the country-year where a bank levy is in 
place – rather than a more refined variable indicating actual taxation at the bank level (Bellucci 
et al., 2017).  
[Table 3 here] 
Specification (2) adds the weighted tax term among the explanatory variables. The average tax 
term reflects incentives for reallocating debt internationally created by differences in the level 
of corporate taxation across countries. As expected, the estimated partial effect is negative, and 
statistically significant. Thus, the debt ratios of bank affiliates decrease as the tax rates in 
locations other than the host country increase, ceteris paribus. This suggests that, in setting their 
optimal financial structure, banking groups exploit the relative cost advantage of the debt tax 
shelter across the countries where they have operations. In other words, multinational banks 
locate their debt where it is comparatively cheaper due to interest deductibility. While sizable, 
according to our estimates the impact of the international debt shifting remains below that of 
the traditional debt bias channel. The partial effect implies that an increase of 10 percentage 
points in the average corporate tax rate in other group locales decreases the debt ratio of a bank 
affiliate by roughly two percentage points on average. The order of magnitude of the partial 
effect is consistent with the evidence in Gu et al. (2015), who report an estimated linear 
coefficient of around 0.2 for the average tax rate of the groups, expressed as a difference with 
respect to that in the host country. The estimated impacts of the other economic and policy 
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controls are quantitatively similar to those in specification (1). However, it is noteworthy that 
the coefficient for the parent indicator is now strongly significant. The point estimate of -0.04 
implies that the debt ratios of parent banks are on average four percentage points lower than 
those of subsidiaries. In other words, parents are better capitalized than their subsidiaries. This 
corroborates the view that capital structure choices act as an incentive scheme when contracts 
are incomplete.  
Specification (3) add country fixed effects to the previous model. As discussed above, given 
our sample period, the country fixed effects might capture unobservable effects that reflect 
country-specific adjustments in national banking sectors in the crisis and post-crisis period, 
most notably deleveraging (Feyen and del Mazo, 2013). Moreover, with country fixed effects, 
identification for the tax level in the host country is obtained only through time variation. The 
coefficient estimates are quantitatively similar to those without country fixed effects. Finally, 
for the sake of comparison, column (4) reports the results obtained estimating our capital 
structure equation, as in specification (2), using a linear model. The order of magnitude of the 
ordinary least squares parameters is comparable to the average marginal effects from the 
fractional probit model.  
3.1.1 Robustness checks 
We perform several robustness tests on our baseline specifications. First, we test if our baseline 
results are robust to heterogeneity across banks. Compliance with the regulatory capital 
requirement is an important source of heterogeneity as regards the responsiveness to taxes 
(Keen and de Mooij, 2016). Banks closer to the regulatory minimum level of capital have 
relatively less room for increasing their debt level in the presence of high corporate taxes. By 
contrast, banks with large capital buffers are in principle less constrained to adjust debt 
following a more generous tax shield. Accordingly, we split our sample in two equally sized 
sub-samples of banks based on their level of capitalization. Specifically, capital-abundant banks 
are those above the median level of the country-specific equity to risk-weighted assets. Capital-
tight banks are those below the threshold. We run our baseline regressions for the two sub-
samples, and report the average marginal effects in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. The results 
for capital-abundant banks in column (2) are qualitatively similar to those for the full sample. 
Column (1) shows that the tax responsiveness of capital-tight banks is indeed smaller than that 
for the full sample of all banks, for both the debt bias and the debt shifting channels. Thus, 
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while somewhat constrained in their ability to increase debt ratio, taxation is still a significant 
determinant of the financial decisions of capital-tight banks.  
Furthermore, we check the sensitivity of our results to different sample definitions. First, we 
drop banks that report always negative profits in all sample years. For these banks the interest 
deduction is less valuable than for profitable banks due to the non-debt tax shield. Moreover, 
particularly in our sample period, loss-making banks might be close to financial distress, and 
thus likely to alter their financial policy compared to ‘normal times’. The results, reported in 
column (3), are quantitatively similar to those in our baseline specification. Next, we limit the 
sample to parent banks and their foreign affiliates. We are left with 1,340 observations, 
basically half of the initial sample. The results are shown in column (4), and are not significantly 
different from those obtained for the full sample of banks. Finally, in specification (5), we 
restrict the analysis to multinational groups, i.e. groups with at least one foreign affiliate. Again, 
we find robust evidence that both the debt bias and the debt shifting channels drive the financial 
choices of multinational bank affiliates.   
[Table 4 here] 
3.2 Risk-weighted asset densities 
Next, we estimate the fractional regression model for asset risk, where are dependent variable 
is the ratio between risk-weighted assets and total assets. The marginal effects are reported in 
Table 5. As is apparent, the number of observations in our sample decreases considerably, due 
to missing information on the left-hand side variable. The baseline specification with both tax 
terms is in column (1). As expected, the local tax rate has a negative impact on risk-weighted 
asset density. The magnitude implies that a one percent increase in the local tax rate decreases 
the risk-weighted asset density by roughly one percentage points. The weighted average tax 
affects the risk-weighted asset density positively, roughly by the same order of magnitude as 
the local tax rate. Among the other controls that have a significant impact on the risk weight of 
assets, size has a positive sign. This might reflect moral hazard due to too-big-to-fail implicit 
guarantees. At the margin, however, the effect of size is decreasing, as suggested by the negative 
sign on the asset growth variable. Moreover, collateral is negatively associated with asset risk, 
likely reflecting composition effects with different risk profiles on the asset side of banks’ 
balance sheets. By contrast, profitability, as well as the macroeconomic and policy variables, 
do not seem to affect risk-weighted assets significantly.  
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Like for the debt ratio, we test the robustness of the main results across different sample 
definitions. First, we find that the effects of taxation are qualitatively similar for capital tight 
banks, whereas capital abundant banks seem to be less sensitive to the tax incentives to shifting 
asset riskiness. If we restrict the sample to foreign subsidiaries and parent banks, the effects of 
the local tax rate, while still negative, is not identified with precision. Finally, the results for 
multinational groups are in line with the baseline specification.  
[Table 5 here] 
3.3 Interpretation  
The fractional model does not constrain the impact of taxation to be constant like a linear 
regression model does. To evaluate the importance of nonlinearities, and their implications for 
country-specific results, in Table 6 we report the average marginal effects of the tax variables 
at the country level. To single out the impact of taxation, the marginal effects are evaluated at 
the full sample means for all explanatory variables except the two tax terms, for which we use 
the country-specific averages instead. For reference, we also report the average values of the 
tax variables and the predicted debt ratios and risk-weighted asset densities.  
In the case of the debt ratios, the average country-specific marginal effects for the host country 
tax level range from 0.22 to 0.43. Those for the weighted tax of the group vary between 0.16 
and 0.32 (in absolute value). As is apparent, the marginal effects of the local tax decrease with 
the level of local taxation, likely reflecting the constraints that banks face in increasing their 
leverage when debt levels are already high, which is the case in high-tax countries. The impact 
of the weighted tax increases with the level of this variable. As expected, higher tax rates in the 
alternative locations where the banking group operates lead to a more pronounced reaction of 
debt ratios in the local jurisdiction, ceteris paribus. 
The marginal effects of taxes on risk-weighted asset densities are larger in magnitude but have 
a much lower variability than those for the debt ratios. Nonlinearities seem significantly less 
important for the asset risk variable. Marginal effects of the local tax rate range between 0.8 
and 0.9 (in absolute value), while those for the weighted tax term vary between 0.7 and 0.78.  
 [Table 6 here] 
4. The international spillovers of corporate taxes  
The econometric analysis highlights the specificities of multinational banks in terms of 
locations and tax implications of their international operations as a persistent factor that affects 
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their debt choices. Specifically, location of debt within a multinational group is affected by tax 
considerations, as tax differences among different locales are exploited to minimize the overall 
cost of debt of the group. The fact that the debt ratio in each affiliate depends not only on the 
local tax rate but also on the tax rates in the other countries where the bank operates implies 
that tax reforms in these foreign jurisdictions will have a direct effect on the financial policy of 
all group affiliates via adjustment on the intensive margin. Otherwise said, tax reforms affect 
not only the debt level of local banks but also the leverage of banks located in other countries.  
We evaluate the implications of hypothetical tax reforms that eliminate the favourable tax 
treatment of debt over equity by means of simulations. First, starting from our econometric 
model, we predict the counterfactual debt ratios implied by our estimates in the different reform 
scenarios. Then, following Langedijk et al. (2015), we assess the financial stability implications 
of the tax reforms using a microsimulation bank portfolio model. The next sections describe 
more in detail the simulation framework and the working assumptions to build the tax reform 
scenarios. If multinational banks arbitrage across countries to exploit corporate tax differences, 
tax reforms generate international spillovers. We highlight that, even in our stylised setup, the 
degree of coordination in the implementation of tax reforms matters a lot for the aggregate 
impacts of the reforms.  
4.1 The impact of eliminating the tax bias towards debt finance  
As a starting point, we consider the counterfactual balance sheet outcomes that would be 
realized once the debt bias in the corporate income tax is eliminated. If we believe that the 
econometric model properly captures the determinants of debt ratios and asset risk, we can use 
its predictions to model adjustments to banks’ capital structure choices. Specifically, we assume 
that banks alter their capital structure and the risk-weight of their asset as a response to the tax 
reforms without changing the size of their balance sheets. Formally, from model (1) we can 
directly derive the counterfactual relevant outcome variable for bank 𝑖, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡, as:  
?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖,𝑡 +△ ?̂?𝑖,𝑡, 
where △ ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 is the predicted change in the debt-to-asset ratio and risk-weighted asset densities, 
respectively, to be detailed below. Applying the balance sheet identity 𝑇𝐴 = 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐾, we can 
retrieve the implied new capital levels which determine the excess losses in the microsimulation 
exercise, together with asset risk.  
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The level of the corporate income tax rate determines the value of the deduction for interest 
payments. Hence, all other things equal, a simple way to model the elimination of debt bias in 
our framework is setting the corporate tax rate to zero12. Furthermore, since we have separately 
identified the debt bias and the debt shifting effect in the econometric model, we can parse the 
different implications of these channels on systemic risk. Specifically, we do so by assuming 
three hypothetical reform scenarios.   
Case (a): coordinated reform. In this case we assume that all countries eliminate the favourable 
tax treatment of debt with respect to equity. Consequently, the predicted change in the outcome 
variables is:  
△ ?̂?𝑖
(𝒂)
= Φ(𝒙(𝒂)𝜷)|𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖=0, 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖=0 − Φ(𝒙𝜷) 
where Φ(. ) is the normal cumulative distribution function, and 𝒙(𝒂) are the same covariates in 
the econometric model (𝒙), except for the tax variables. The coordinated tax reform assumes 
that all countries implement the reform simultaneously. Thus, the counterfactual imposes that 
both the host country tax and the average tax rate of the group in model (1) are driven to zero.  
Case (b): uncoordinated reform. In this case we assume that all countries but the host country 
of bank 𝑖 implement the reform. Naturally, this will artificially eliminate the channel of 
international debt shifting, leaving only the domestic debt bias effect of corporate taxes. The 
predicted change in the outcome variables is:  
△ ?̂?𝑖
(𝒃)
= Φ(𝒙(𝒃)𝜷)| 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖=0 − Φ(𝒙𝜷) 
where the counterfactual probability function is calculated by imposing 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 = 0.  
Case (c): unilateral reform. As the mirror image of the previous case, in this scenario we 
assume that only the host country of bank 𝑖 implements the reform. As a consequence, while 
the debt bias is eliminated, international debt shifting towards countries where interest 
payments are still deductible will be taking place. Likewise, asset riskiness would increase in 
the host country accordingly. The predicted change in the two outcome variables is thus:  
△ ?̂?𝑖
(𝒄)
= Φ(𝒙(𝒄)𝜷)| 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖=0 − Φ(𝒙𝜷) 
where the counterfactual probability function is calculated by imposing 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖 = 0.  
                                           
12 In our stylised setting, we do not discuss the alternative modalities of establishing tax neutrality between debt and equity. 
For a critical discussion, see e.g. Fatica et al. (2013).  
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4.2 The micro-simulation model  
To evaluate the systemic risk implications of tax reforms that eliminate the favourable tax 
treatment of debt over equity we use a microsimulation model for banking losses, which is 
referred to as SYMBOL (SYstemic Model of Bank Originated Losses). The model, which fits 
within the Basel framework for banks’ minimum capital requirements, been recently used to 
quantitatively assess the impacts of regulatory reforms in Europe, including the complete 
safety-net set up after the crisis, i.e. enhanced Basel III capital rules, the bail-in tool and the 
resolution funds (De Lisa et al., 2012; Benczur et al., 2017). In the model framework, financial 
stability is evaluated in terms of the losses materializing in the event of a severe financial crisis. 
More specifically, our focus is on excess losses, i.e. those losses that cannot be absorbed due to 
exhaustion of the ad hoc safety nets, as will be made clear below.  
We evaluate the impact of hypothetical reforms, namely the abolition of the interest 
deductibility under the corporate income tax implemented with different degrees of 
coordination among countries, by comparing simulated contingent liabilities conditional on a 
crisis event taking place in two different scenarios: i) the baseline, with observed balance sheet 
data; ii) the counterfactual post-reform scenario, where banks’ capital structures and asset risk 
have been adjusted following the hypothetical tax reforms. In this way, we obtain two sets of 
aggregate excess losses generated in the national banking systems. In the context of our 
exercise, we refer to any reduction in such losses as the benefits of the tax reforms. By its very 
nature, our exercise is limited to assessing this particular benefit, while potential effects spilling 
over to the real economy and macroeconomic variables are not considered here13.  
The SYMBOL model uses publicly available balance sheet data of banks in the EU to estimate 
the joint distribution of bank losses at EU level, in a way that is fully consistent with the 
regulatory architecture governing the banking sector, i.e. the Basel risk assessment framework. 
The loss distribution of an individual bank depends on an estimated (average) implied obligor 
probability of default (IOPD) in each bank’s portfolio. In turn, the IOPD is a function of an 
adjusted risk-weighted asset density. Thus, as a first step of the model simulations, the average 
IOPD is obtained via numerical inversion of the Basel formula for credit risk and using balance 
sheet data on the risk weight of assets and total assets14. Then, correlated bank losses are 
                                           
13 Likewise, we do not consider the first-round public finance impacts of eliminating the tax advantage of debt.  
14 For the purpose of the simulation exercise, capital and risk weighted assets have been adjusted by using the correction 
coefficients provided by the Basel III monitoring exercise (Quantitative Impact Study, QIS) run by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA, Basel III monitoring exercise, 2015) and (EBA, CRD IV–CRR/Basel III monitoring exercise report, 2015). 
These adjustments aim to better represent the level and quality of capital and the proper calculation of risk. Hence, they would 
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generated via Monte Carlo simulations using the Basel Internal Rating Based (IRB) function 
(see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013; Vasicek, 2002; Merton, 1974)15. The 
correlation exists either as a consequence of the banks’ exposure to common borrowers or, more 
generally, to a particular common factor, such as the business cycle. Based on the matrix of 
correlated losses, failure of a bank is determined by comparing the size of simulated losses and 
the regulatory capital available to absorb the shocks.  
More formally, the output of the model is a matrix of losses, 𝐿𝑛,𝑖, where n denotes a simulation 
run and i indicates the bank. Let us denote the expected loss for bank i by 𝐸𝐿𝑖. After provisions, 
capital is the first source to absorb unexpected losses. In this framework, bank i is assumed to 
be insolvent when simulated unexpected losses (𝐿𝑛,𝑖 − 𝐸𝐿𝑖) exhaust all available capital, 𝐾𝑖, 
or, otherwise said, when it has positive excess losses (ExcL): 
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 ≡ 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝐿𝑛,𝑖 − 𝐸𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 > 0.  
Furthermore, consistent with the Basel rules on the level of minimum capital under which a 
bank is considered viable and actual recapitalization interventions by public authorities in the 
past crisis, recapitalization needs up to 10.5 percent of risk-weighted assets are also considered. 
Formally, a bank is considered undercapitalized when: 
𝐾𝑖 −  (𝐿𝑛,𝑖 − 𝐸𝐿𝑖) < 0.105 ∙ 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑖 . 
All in all, the entries in the matrix of excess losses plus recapitalization needs look like:  
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝐿𝑅𝑛,𝑖 = max {𝐿𝑛,𝑖 − 𝐸𝐿𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖 + 0.105 ∙ 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑖; 0}. 
Throughout the rest of the paper, we refer to losses as the losses in excess of capital plus 
recapitalization needs (𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑅𝐿𝑛,𝑖). Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the 
distribution of losses for an individual bank. The white area shows the different loss absorption 
mechanisms at work at the bank level, i.e. provisions, minimum capital requirements (MCR) 
and a capital buffer (or excess capital, EC) that normally banks keep in excess of the regulatory 
minimum. Thus, the actual level of capital held by each bank determines the failure event as 
defined above, which occurs in the light grey area. Expectedly, the probability density function 
of losses for an individual bank is skewed to the right, i.e. there is a very small probability of 
                                           
decrease capital and increase RWA. These correction coefficients change year by year. For 2014 we have used the value 
reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
15 The loss distribution is simulated under a number of assumptions, namely: i) implicitly, the model is based on the implicit 
assumption that the Basel IRB formula adequately represents (credit) risks that banks are exposed to; ii) all risks are assimilated 
to credit risk, and no other risk categories (e.g. market, liquidity or counterparty risks) are explicitly considered as potential 
trigger of a default event; iii) all events happen at the same time, i.e. there is no sequencing and cascading in the simulated 
events. 
22 
 
extremely large losses and a high probability of losses that are closer to the average/expected 
loss. Operationally, we consider the case of a systemic crisis event, generating losses of the 
same order of magnitude of the losses incurred by the EU banking system in the period 2008-
2012. If data as 2009 are considered this corresponds, roughly, to the 99.95th quantile of the 
unconditional EU28 aggregate distribution of losses in excess of capital plus recapitalization 
needs. Thus, a loss distribution with 99.95% Value at Risk (VaR) is adopted throughout in the 
simulations of the different scenarios16. Aggregate losses are obtained by summing losses in 
excess of capital plus potential recapitalization needs of all distressed banks in the system (i.e. 
both failed and undercapitalised banks) in each simulation run. 
[Figure 2 here] 
We perform our quantitative exercise for the whole EU28 banking sector. Running the model 
for small and large countries together allows one to reduce the potential numerical instability 
of the simulations. Losses produced in individual countries are then extracted from the whole 
sample simulations. As an additional working hypothesis, we assume that full bail-out prevents 
the spreading of contagion through the interbank market, so as to rule out contagion effects17.  
5. Results  
What are the implications for systemic risk of the different tax reform scenarios? In the next 
step of our analysis, we answer this question using the microsimulation model for banking 
losses described in the previous section. Specifically, we run the model for the baseline scenario 
with observed balance sheet data and for the counterfactual scenarios where banks’ balance 
sheets are adjusted following the elimination of the tax subsidy to debt. We adopt different 
assumptions with respect to the number of countries implementing the reform, giving rise to 
three alternative scenarios, detailed in section 4.1. As a first step, to calculate the counterfactual 
debt ratios and risk-weighted asset densities, we obtain the predicted changes for these variables 
in the different scenarios. We use 2014 – the last year in our econometric sample – as the 
reference year for this exercise. Also, we focus on the country-specific results for the six major 
European banking sector – Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. Figure 2 shows the results in terms of national banking sector losses as a 
percentage of total assets obtained via microsimulation. The dark blue bars depict the losses in 
                                           
16 To smooth out uncertainty due to different losses realization we use a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter and we compute the 
99.95th percentile on the smoothed HP trend. 
17 In this way, we can focus on the spillovers generated by tax policy, not on those arising from network effects in the banking 
system.  
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the baseline case, which, by construction, represent the outcome in the hypothetical event of a 
severe banking crisis taking place at the end of 2014. Simulated losses in the baseline scenario 
when actual balance sheet data are used range from 0.4 percent of total assets in the United 
Kingdom to 1.3 percent in Germany18.  
In the case of a coordinated elimination of the favourable tax treatment of debt, by assumption 
all countries would establish neutrality between debt and equity finance. The gains from 
coordinated tax reforms stem from the combined elimination of the two channels through which 
taxation affects debt and asset risk. On one hand, the reform in the host country leads local 
banks to decrease their debt ratios, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the fact that debt loses its 
tax advantage in all other locations eliminates the incentives for shifting debt and risk across 
borders, and indirectly favour the accumulation of debt in the host country, all other things 
being equal. According to our econometric results, the former effect predominates over the 
latter, leading to a decrease in debt ratios compared to the baseline in all reforming countries. 
However, we expect the risk-weighted asset density to increase. Indeed, since banks are better 
capitalized after the tax reform, scope is created for them to increase the riskiness of the asset 
side of their balance sheet, for given capital requirements. The net effect on systemic risk is 
ultimately an empirical question. In our simulations, a coordinated elimination of the tax 
subsidy to debt reduces systemic losses with respect to the baseline, as depicted by the light 
blue bars in Figure 2. Overall, the impact on capital structure predominates over the increased 
riskiness on the asset side. The net effect is an improvement in financial stability, with a 
reduction in losses that is substantial particularly in high-tax countries.   
[Figure 2 here] 
Let us now suppose that the elimination of the debt bias takes place in an uncoordinated fashion. 
We define this scenario as a situation in which all countries, except the host country, establish 
tax neutrality between debt and equity finance. In our stylised setup, this is equivalent to 
eliminating the channel of international debt and risk shifting for each multinational bank 
affiliate, while local corporate taxes would still favour debt over equity. Thus, as a consequence 
of the foreign tax reforms, debt ratios of banks in the non-reforming countries increase. At the 
same time, however, banks in the non-reforming country would decrease the riskiness of their 
loan portfolios. Accordingly, excess losses increase with respect to the baseline in all countries, 
                                           
18 Excess losses incorporate recapitalization to 10.5 percent of risk-weighted assets (see section 4.2). The relatively high value 
for Germany might be due to the fact that, by considering only banking groups, we underestimate the riskiness of other banking 
sectors where standalone banks are more numerous. 
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with the exception of France where the impact of lower riskiness on the asset side predominates. 
The light grey bars in Figure 2 give a visual representation of the results. 
Finally, we consider the case of unilateral elimination of the tax bias in favour of debt. 
Specifically, we assume that the reform is implemented only in the host country, while all the 
other countries still keep a tax advantage for debt. As a mirror image of the previous scenario, 
taking up debt in the host jurisdiction becomes comparatively less advantageous. However, the 
channel of international shifting is still at play. Therefore, debt ratios in the reforming country 
decrease more markedly than in the case of coordinated reforms, since in this case debt can still 
be profitably reallocated across national borders within the banking group. All in all, the debt 
ratios in the host country decrease significantly compared to the baseline case, while the 
opposite occurs for the risk weight of assets. The individual country gain in terms of lower 
losses is substantial in comparison to the baseline case. In this case, excess losses for the 
national banking sectors vary from 0.3% to 0.7% of total assets.   
From the individual country perspective, a unilateral tax reform is clearly preferable. However, 
this is not necessarily so at the aggregate level. In Figure 3 we plot the reduction in aggregate 
losses with respect to the baseline in the different reform scenarios. As is apparent, naturally 
unilateral tax reforms reduce only marginally the aggregate cost of a bank crisis with respect to 
the baseline case (dark blue bars). By contrast, uncoordinated and coordinated reforms 
significantly reduce aggregate systemic losses. However, the benefits of coordinated reforms 
are larger in all cases considered.  
 [Figure 3 here] 
Next, we investigate whether and how the distribution of losses across countries changes in the 
different reform scenarios, conditional on the different aggregated values depicted in Figure 3 
above. Table 7 reports the share of losses in each of the countries, considered in turn. The 
contribution of the different countries to aggregate losses when tax reforms are coordinated 
resembles that of the baseline case. Uncoordinated reforms determine a sizable increase in the 
contribution of the individual countries to losses. The increase is significantly less marked for 
France. However, that country still accounts for more than half total post-reform losses. At the 
other extreme, in general, unilateral reforms decrease significantly the loss share of the 
individual countries with respect to the baseline. The contribution remains rather stable in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
[Table 7 here] 
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6.  Discussion  
The results from the microsimulation exercise highlight the benefits of tax reform coordination 
in terms of financial stability. A few comments are in order with respect to the model 
simulations, concerning our working assumptions and findings. First, importantly, the 
counterfactual bank balance sheets used to simulate the losses under different reform scenarios 
are obtained by applying the marginal effects from the fractional regression model, under the 
assumption that the banks do not change the size of their balance sheet. Thus, we assuming that 
the elimination of the favourable treatment of debt would only change the composition of 
banks’ balance sheets. At any rate, accounting for adjustment to asset riskiness allows us to take 
a cautious stance and avoid over-estimating the reduction in systemic losses. Intuitively, the 
fact that lower debt ratios trigger at the same time an increase in asset portfolio risk implies a 
reduction in the actual gains to financial stability, as highlighted in Langedijk et al. (2015). In 
general, we deliberately do not over-emphasize the absolute level of the losses obtained in the 
different scenarios, but rather focus on the changes in the comparison across scenarios.  
Second, our proxy for systemic risk in excess losses, i.e. banking losses that would fall on 
economic actors external to the banking sector. In other words, depending on the regulatory 
framework in place, they would be borne by banks’ creditors and depositors by taking a loss on 
their holdings, or eventually translate into contingent liabilities for the government. We remain 
silent on this specific aspect. In particular, we do not consider the complete safety-net set up in 
EU legislation to absorb banking losses in addition to enhanced Basel III capital rules, such as 
the bail-in tool and the resolution funds analysed in Benczur et al. (2017). The rationale behind 
this choice is indeed to isolate the effects on systemic risk of removing the tax bias towards 
debt finance. At any rate, our results have clear implications for social welfare.   
Third, a word of caution is in order when it comes to our measure for asset risk. As is well-
known, risk-weighted assets do not necessarily reflect actual portfolio risk in an adequate way. 
On one hand, the weights are defined by regulation for broad categories of assets. On the other 
hand, given their pivotal role in defining minimum capital requirements, risk-weighted assets 
are prone to manipulation by banks, particularly by the largest intermediaries that make use of 
internal risk models (Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2014). If this is the case, then the predicted 
changes in the risk weight of assets would not fully match the change in true portfolio risk 
following corporate tax reforms. However, in spite of these drawbacks, regulatory risk-
weighted assets are still widely used in the banking literature to assess banks’ response to 
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financial regulations and policy change (Keen and de Mooij, 2016). Moreover, the measure is 
fully consistent with our microsimulation model.  
Admittedly, our framework is very stylised. A complete characterization of banks’ debt 
dynamics would require a fully-fledged model of bank behaviour, accompanied, on the 
empirical side, by more detailed data on the structure of multinational banks’ financing. In this 
respect, internal capital markets represent an important element Egger et al. (2014). In fact, 
total debt conflates internal and external borrowing, which are likely to react differently to 
changes in the after-tax cost of funds (Desai et al., 2004). In particular, Buettner and Wamser 
(2009), and more recently Reiter (2017), highlight the role of internal capital markets as a 
channel for profit shifting. Borrowing from affiliates located in low-tax countries and lending 
to affiliates located in high-tax countries will allow the latter to reduce profits by deducting 
interest payments, which are then taxed as earnings in the low-tax country. Disentangling 
whether and to what extent internal debt is used for profit shifting or whether allocation of debt 
within multinational banks reflects the conventional tax shelter of debt finance will improve 
our understanding of the existing empirical evidence on the tax-sensitivity of capital structure. 
However, the data at hand does not allow for an empirical investigation of this type.  
7. Conclusions 
By granting a rebate to interest payments while taxing the return to equity, corporate income 
tax systems typically encourage the use of debt rather than equity finance. This incentive grows 
as the corporate tax rate rises, so high corporate taxes are expected to be associated with greater 
corporate indebtedness. At the same time, however, bank regulation on minimum capital 
requirements, as in the Basel framework, create dependency between bank leverage and risk. 
In this paper we investigate the impact of corporate taxation on capital structure and asset risk 
choices of banking groups in Europe. Further, applying the framework put forward in Langedijk 
et al. (2015), we evaluate the systemic risk implications of establishing tax neutrality between 
debt and equity finance. We disentangle two channels through which corporate taxes affect 
leverage due to the deductibility of interest payments: i) the standard debt bias effect, which 
encourages the use of debt because of the level of local taxation; ii) the debt shifting effect, 
which allows multinational groups to minimize the cost of debt by taking advantage of 
international tax differences. The impact on asset risk is reversed, given the incentive to shift 
risk between the liability and the asset side of the balance sheet under minimum capital 
requirements. Using bank balance sheet data from Bankscope, we find evidence of both effects 
for multinational banks in Europe during the crisis and post-crisis period. We then evaluate the 
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effects of a complete elimination of the favourable tax treatment of debt on financial stability, 
quantified as the systemic losses in the event of a severe banking crisis. We show that the degree 
of coordination in implementing the tax reform matters, both at national and at aggregate levels. 
Indeed, national tax reforms generate spillovers through the cross-border activities of 
multinational banks. In particular, a coordinated elimination of the tax bias towards debt would 
result in a significant reduction of aggregate losses. By contrast, unilateral tax reforms, while 
beneficial for the reforming country, indirectly increase systemic risk in the countries where 
equity finance is still penalised by the tax system.  
Our findings point to a significant gain in terms of financial stability from tax harmonization 
aimed at creating a level playing field between debt and equity finance. Indirectly, they 
highlight the benefits of coordinated initiatives such as the Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base, which introduces an allowance for corporate equity that makes increases in equity 
deductible from the taxable base.  
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Annex 1 
Table A1: QIS adjustment factors for 2014 used in the SYMBOL model 
RWA Capital 
2014 G-SIIs G1 Medium G2 Small G2 G-SIIs G1 Medium G2 Small G2 
1 1.007 1.006 1 0.87 0.9 0.93 0.92 
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Tables and figures  
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of banks by ownership status and country 
Country Parent banks 
National 
subsidiaries 
Foreign subsidiaries 
by home 
country 
by host 
country 
AT 10 29 25 7 
BE 4 7 17 5 
BG 0 1 0 7 
CY 1 0 1 2 
CZ 1 0 1 11 
DE 17 42 25 26 
DK 4 7 4 3 
EE 0 0 0 2 
ES 10 19 15 8 
FI 0 4 0 2 
FR 10 97 48 6 
GB 7 32 9 13 
GR 4 1 10 0 
HR 0 0 0 1 
HU 2 4 3 7 
IE 1 5 3 6 
IT 19 45 26 7 
LT 0 0 0 3 
LU 0 2 1 38 
LV 1 0 1 2 
MT 0 1 0 4 
NL 5 7 13 4 
PL 1 1 1 23 
PT 4 5 3 7 
RO 0 0 0 11 
SE 4 8 13 1 
SI 1 1 1 6 
SK 0 0 0 8 
Total 106 318 220 220 
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Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics  
  Obs.  mean st. dev.  25th percentile  median  75th percentile 
Debt-to-assets ratio 2,573  0.905 0.110 0.896 0.925 0.948 
RWA-density 1,553  0.514 0.208 0.378 0.529 0.665 
Host country tax 2,573  0.270 0.062 0.240 0.265 0.340 
Average tax (asset-weighted) 2,573  0.224 0.106 0.213 0.259 0.337 
Parent dummy 2,573  0.157 0.364 0.170 0.207 0.259 
Assets (logs) 2,573  9.370 3.093 8.132 9.899 11.301 
Profitability 2,573  0.004 0.032 0.001 0.005 0.010 
Asset growth 2,573  0.060 0.345 -0.041 0.020 0.089 
Collateral  2,573  0.206 0.179 0.049 0.136 0.285 
GDP growth 2,573  0.002 0.028 -0.008 0.007 0.020 
Inflation 2,573  0.017 0.012 0.009 0.015 0.025 
State aid to banking sector 2,573  0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Exposure to bank levy 2,573  0.423 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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Table 3. Determinants of bank debt ratios 
 Local tax Baseline Country fixed 
effects 
OLS                                  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Host country tax  0.310*** 0.292*** 0.344*** 0.304*** 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.120) (0.084) 
Weighted average tax  -0.219*** -0.194*** -0.181** 
  (0.062) (0.061) (0.081) 
Parent dummy -0.010 -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.038*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Size 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Asset growth 0.023** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.024** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Profitability 0.035 0.040 0.041 0.091 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.114) (0.272) 
Collateral 0.035 0.031 0.027 0.032 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.027) (0.040) 
GDP growth -0.054 -0.045 -0.033 0.011 
 (0.133) (0.130) (0.067) (0.173) 
Inflation -0.414* -0.378* -0.281* -0.350 
 (0.222) (0.218) (0.144) (0.273) 
State aid to banking sector 2.024* 1.848* 1.998** 1.816 
 (1.063) (1.302) (0.941) (1.168) 
Exposure to bank levy 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) 
     
Year dummies x x x x 
Group dummies x x x x 
Country dummies     x  
     
Notes: columns (1)-(3) report the average marginal effects from a probit fractional response model for bank debt ratios estimated by pooled 
quasi-maximum likelihood. Column (4) reports the coefficient estimate from a linear regression model estimated with OLS. The number 
of observations is 2,573 (Number of banks: 515; number of groups: 133). Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the bank 
affiliate level, are reported in parentheses. In the specifications (1)-(3) standard errors are obtained with the delta method. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4. Determinants of bank debt ratios – robustness checks 
Capital-tight Capital-abundant Always profitable Only foreign 
subsidiaries & 
parents 
Only multinational  
groups  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Host country tax  0.222*** 0.308*** 0.275*** 0.252*** 0.286*** 
(0.030) (0.116) (0.066) (0.055) (0.068) 
Weighted average tax -0.092*** -0.292* -0.239*** -0.198** -0.179*** 
(0.024) (0.157) (0.062) (0.095) (0.068) 
Parent dummy -0.012** -0.036 -0.042*** -0.027 -0.025* 
(0.005) (0.029) (0.010) (0.020) (0.013) 
Size 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Asset growth 0.010*** 0.026** 0.024** 0.011* 0.028** 
(0.003) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) 
Profitability -0.167*** 0.174* 0.015 -0.301*** 0.081 
(0.060) (0.103) (0.143) (0.100) (0.124) 
Collateral 0.032*** -0.033 0.030 0.027 0.020 
(0.011) (0.048) (0.033) (0.026) (0.036) 
GDP growth -0.091* 0.396 -0.039 -0.019 -0.057 
(0.048) (0.246) (0.133) (0.077) (0.138) 
Inflation -0.136 0.092 -0.291 -0.052 -0.341 
(0.112) (0.332) (0.220) (0.243) (0.239) 
State aid to banking sector 0.324 3.876 1.869* 1.717 1.526 
(0.594) (2.466) (1.807) (1.104) (1.105) 
Exposure to bank levy -0.003 0.019 0.008 0.006 0.011 
(0.003) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
Year dummies x x x x x 
Banking group dummies x x x x x 
Observations  1,286 1,287 2,470 1,340 2,035 
Number of banks 346 350 489 277 397 
Number of banking groups 115 108 129 113 67 
Notes: the table reports the average marginal effects from a probit fractional response model for bank debt ratios estimated by pooled quasi-maximum 
likelihood. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the bank affiliate level and obtained with the delta method, are reported in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5. Determinants of RWA densities  
 Baseline  Capital-tight 
banks 
Capital-
abundant 
banks 
Only foreign 
subsidiaries & 
parents 
Only 
multinational  
groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Host country tax  -0.901*** -0.777*** -0.919*** -0.480 -0.812*** 
 (0.239) (0.253) (0.330) (0.305) (0.251) 
Weighted average tax 0.776*** 1.080*** 0.442* 0.928*** 1.045*** 
 (0.175) (0.182) (0.265) (0.268) (0.221) 
Parent dummy 0.038 0.154*** -0.056 0.006 0.025 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.050) (0.055) (0.044) 
Size 0.015*** 0.001 0.014** 0.010 0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Asset growth -0.060*** -0.046*** -0.070** -0.061*** -0.086*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.027) (0.021) (0.024) 
Profitability 0.084 0.526 -0.082 0.236 0.103 
 (0.228) (0.564) (0.182) (0.298) (0.242) 
Collateral -0.195** -0.225*** -0.154 -0.313*** -0.178* 
 (0.082) (0.068) (0.141) (0.076) (0.095) 
GDP growth 0.215 -0.037 0.912 -0.154 0.160 
 (0.310) (0.303) (0.596) (0.308) (0.334) 
Inflation 0.338 0.641 0.497 0.758 0.274 
 (0.682) (0.743) (0.932) (0.661) (0.750) 
State aid to banking sector 4.739 3.353 3.733 8.574** 6.556 
 (3.159) (5.242) (3.336) (3.523) (3.381) 
Exposure to bank levy 0.007 -0.001 -0.011 0.007 0.013 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.018) (0.021) 
      
Year dummies x x x x x 
Banking group dummies x x x x x 
Observations  1,553 855 698 939 1,129 
      
Notes: the table reports the average marginal effects from a probit fractional response model for bank RWA densities estimated by pooled 
quasi-maximum likelihood. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the bank affiliate level and obtained with the delta 
method, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 6. Taxes and marginal effects by country 
Country  
Host 
country tax 
Weighted 
tax  
Debt-to-asset ratio  RWA density  
Average 
predicted value 
M.E. of host 
country tax 
M.E. of 
weighted tax 
Average 
predicted value 
M.E. of host 
country tax 
M.E. of 
weighted tax 
AT 0.250 0.175 0.910 0.280 -0.210 0.506 -0.899 0.775 
BE 0.340 0.185 0.931 0.227 -0.170 0.433 -0.886 0.764 
BG 0.100 0.240 0.840 0.425 -0.318 0.684 -0.801 0.690 
CY 0.107 0.168 0.865 0.379 -0.284 0.627 -0.853 0.735 
CZ 0.192 0.241 0.876 0.356 -0.267 0.608 -0.866 0.746 
DE 0.265 0.189 0.911 0.277 -0.207 0.503 -0.899 0.775 
DK 0.249 0.139 0.917 0.263 -0.197 0.479 -0.898 0.774 
EE 0.210 0.236 0.883 0.340 -0.255 0.588 -0.877 0.756 
ES 0.223 0.182 0.900 0.302 -0.226 0.535 -0.896 0.772 
FI 0.243 0.140 0.915 0.267 -0.200 0.485 -0.898 0.774 
FR 0.356 0.318 0.909 0.281 -0.210 0.521 -0.898 0.774 
GB 0.248 0.164 0.912 0.276 -0.207 0.499 -0.899 0.775 
GR 0.265 0.061 0.935 0.217 -0.162 0.405 -0.873 0.752 
HU 0.189 0.219 0.880 0.346 -0.259 0.594 -0.874 0.753 
IE 0.125 0.174 0.870 0.368 -0.276 0.616 -0.861 0.742 
IT 0.276 0.206 0.911 0.278 -0.208 0.506 -0.899 0.775 
LT 0.156 0.209 0.871 0.365 -0.273 0.615 -0.861 0.742 
LU 0.289 0.261 0.902 0.297 -0.223 0.537 -0.895 0.772 
LV 0.150 0.197 0.872 0.363 -0.272 0.611 -0.864 0.745 
MT 0.350 0.259 0.920 0.256 -0.192 0.481 -0.898 0.774 
NL 0.252 0.148 0.916 0.265 -0.199 0.483 -0.898 0.774 
PL 0.190 0.276 0.865 0.377 -0.282 0.635 -0.847 0.730 
PT 0.300 0.203 0.918 0.261 -0.195 0.482 -0.898 0.774 
RO 0.160 0.230 0.867 0.374 -0.280 0.627 -0.853 0.735 
SE 0.249 0.157 0.913 0.272 -0.204 0.493 -0.899 0.775 
SI 0.188 0.211 0.882 0.342 -0.257 0.588 -0.877 0.756 
SK 0.208 0.239 0.882 0.343 -0.257 0.592 -0.875 0.754 
Notes: average values by country. The predicted debt-to-asset ratios and the associated marginal effects are obtained from model (2) in Table 3 (2,573 observations). The 
predicted RWA densities and the associated marginal effects are obtained from model (1) in Table 5 (1,553 observations). They are evaluated at the country-specific 
means of the tax variables and overall sample means of the other explanatory variables. 
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Table 7. Share of aggregate losses (in %) 
   Elimination of favorable tax treatment of debt 
 Baseline coordinated uncoordinated unilateral  
          
DE 22.95 19.79 35.97 10.19 
ES 6.91 3.37 14.64 1.26 
FR 41.62 43.22 51.81 21.61 
IT 6.15 4.17 12.24 0.87 
NL 9.78 13.92 17.82 7.50 
GB 12.58 15.53 24.63 8.11 
          
Note: the table reports the shares of aggregate losses realized in the different countries under the different reform scenarios. 
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Figure 1 Individual bank loss probability distribution 
Figure 2. Losses in the national banking systems (as % of tot assets) for different reform scenarios 
40 
Figure 3. Reduction in aggregate losses (as % of tot assets) with respect to baseline for different reform scenarios 
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